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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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COUNTRY China (Taiwan)

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DATE DISTR. 19 June 1950

SUBJECT Views of CHOU Chih-jou on Invasion and Defense of Taiwan

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1. The Taiwan situation is not as bad as it is pictured in press releases. Nationalist leaders feel that although a Communist attack is possible in 1950 up to October, the Communists will wait until they are sure of success, probably until spring or summer of 1950. The Nationalists believe that Communist preparation for the invasion of Taiwan will stress troop training, equipment, and logistics.
2. Nationalist military leaders feel that the Communists are not now ready to launch an all-out attack because the Nationalists still have air and naval superiority and expect to maintain this advantage through 1950. The Nationalist Air Force has about 90 F-51 fighter planes, 70 percent of which are operable, and a smaller number of B-24's, B-25's, and British mosquito bombers for direct attack on concentrations of invasion vessels on Fukien or Chekiang coasts.
3. It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will use Soviet jet planes in the invasion of Taiwan. The nearest fields large enough to handle jet planes are in the Shanghai-Nanking area, too far away to support landing attempts on Taiwan. A possible base is Foochow Airfield, reportedly being rebuilt and lengthened by the Communists, but air reconnaissance shows no current construction there.* The Nationalists believe that any Communist attempt to land on Taiwan in 1950 without active aid from the Soviets would have no chance of success; such an attempt supported by jet planes and Soviet pilots would have a much better chance.
4. The recent exposure of the Communist spy ring, whose main object was troop defection, has raised troop morale to such an extent that the soldiers now definitely believe the island can be defended.

25X1A [redacted] Comment. Reports from another source indicate that Tan Hsu (譚序) Airfield is being enlarged under Soviet technical direction.

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25X1A [redacted] Comment. [redacted] reported that in late May 400 Soviet technicians and engineers arrived in Foochow.

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